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                                                        Abstract 
According to the International Monetary Fund [IMF] (2013), energy reform efforts have 
been suspended in election years since the year 2000 by the various Ghanaian 
governments, making energy deregulation policy unsustainable.  The IMF (2013) 
identified Ghana’s Cedi depreciation as a cause of this phenomenon, signaling 
institutional weakness in Ghana’s economy.  
Thus, this research explores the potential benefits of strengthening institutions to Ghana’s 
economy with regards to the full petroleum downstream sector deregulation.  
A key research question is to investigate the strategic position of the National Petroleum 
Authority (NPA) in the deregulated petroleum downstream sector. Another question 
seeks to determine challenges Bank of Ghana faces in ensuring a sound and stable 
monetary policy. 
The research design relies mainly on qualitative methods by employing qualitative data 
and some quantitative research techniques and data. The respondents included the NPA, 
the Finance Ministry, the Bank of Ghana, Imani Ghana, Association of Oil Marketing 
Companies, Institute of Economic Affairs, and Africa Centre for Energy Policy.  
Key among the findings is that the Executive arm of government has the constitutional 
power to use certificate of urgency to alter market outcomes, especially when fuel prices 
are soaring beyond expectations.  
Keywords: deregulation, institutions, economy, downstream, benefits, and Ghana.                                                                                                                                  
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List of acronyms and definitions  
List of acronyms 
ACRONYM MEANING 
ACEP  African Centre for Energy Policy 
BDCs Bulk Distribution Companies 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
NPA National Petroleum Authority 
OMCs Oil Marketing Companies 
TOR Tema Oil Refinery 
 




Energy deregulation is defined in broad terms and encompasses 
privatisation, the sale or transfer of government assets to the private 
sector, and restructuring, the move towards more competitive markets; 
and this implies transition from regulated or controlled to market-based 
energy prices (Thierry Lefevre and Jessie L. Todoc, 1999)  . 
Institutions Institutions are defined as the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 




Downstream petroleum sector encompasses importation, 
exportation,reexportation,shipment,transportation,processing,refining,st
orage,distribution, marketing and sale of petroleum products (NPA, 
2015) 
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                                         Chapter 1: Introduction   
1.0 Introduction  
     According to Lefevre and Todoc (1999), energy deregulation is defined in 
broad terms and encompasses privatization, the sale or transfer of government assets to 
the private sector, restructuring, and the move towards more competitive markets. Thus, 
deregulation typically implies transition from regulated or controlled to market-based 
energy prices. 
   Basically, deregulation allows the forces of demand and supply to directly 
determine the economic outcome of an industry. In part, deregulation means that 
policymakers reallocate subsidies, which effectively leads to a decline in budget deficit. 
This is because, according to the international ratings agency, FitchRatings, the decision 
to sharply increase utility tariffs and scrap fuel subsidy reduces the risk of an overrun in 
coming fiscal years (Altenkirch, 2013). Another economic rationale for deregulation is to 
allow market participation in order to increase efficiency and reduce wastage. According 
to the African Centre for Energy Policy [ACEP] (2015), deregulation reduces the impact 
of persistent shocks and anxiety introduced into the market whenever the government 
regulates an industry. 
   Deregulation has been practiced by several international economies, producing 
varying results. For example, Harker and Price (2006) pointed out that the government of 
England reformed the English energy sector in the 1990s to allow market participation. 
Narrating the result of that reform, James and Stephen (2000) argued that the lack of 
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consideration for market power undermined the goal of that deregulation policy, leading 
to a regulatory backlash.  
The International Monetary Fund [IMF] (2013) has indicated that in Latin 
America, Brazil and Chile were successful at implementing deregulation. IMF (2013) 
further identified that, in Africa, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa have been successful 
at implementing full deregulation in electricity and fuel respectively. According to 
Winston (1998), federal regulatory agencies and the U.S Congress began liberalizing 
pricing, entry, and exit in the transportation, financial, energy, and communications 
industries in the United States of America during the mid-1970s. 
 For the purpose of this research, the focus is on Ghana, a sub-Saharan country 
that has since July 2015 fully deregulated her petroleum downstream sector. Ghana’s 
petroleum downstream sector is categorized into three main sectors: the upstream, 
midstream, and the downstream. According to Armah and Torku (2016), Ghana currently 
is in commercial production of oil and gas, which commenced in late 2010.  
According to the National Petroleum Authority [NPA] (2015), Ghana’s 
downstream petroleum sector encompasses importation, exportation, re-exportation, 
shipment, transportation, processing, refining, storage, distribution, marketing and sale of 
petroleum products, and it contributes about 10% of Ghana’s GDP. Ghana’s sector starts 
from the Tema Oil Refinery, a state owned enterprise, and Platon Gas Oil Ghana Limited, 
a privately owned refinery. The sector ends with the final consumer, as identified in the 
diagram 1.1 below. 
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Diagram 1. 1The petroleum downstream sector of Ghana 
             Source: Researcher’s own diagram.                 
Diagram 1.1 shows that the petroleum products that are manufactured at the two 
refineries in Ghana, together with imports from the international markets, are distributed 
by the BDCs to the OMCs before the final consumer makes a purchase. According to the 
NPA (2015), there are about 137 OMCs and 28 BDCs currently operating in the 
downstream petroleum sector.  
Ministry of Finance (2005) identified that, historically, Ghana’s downstream 
petroleum sector deregulation policy partially commenced on Friday 18th February, 
2005, but that policy did not allow the market to set prices. The prices for petroleum 
products were arrived at on the basis of the existing pricing formula and were designed to 
realign prices with international prices for crude oil by the National Petroleum Authority. 
IMF (2013) has shown that since 2004, Ghana’s deregulation policy has allowed oil 
marketing companies to enter the market for importing and distributing crude oil and 
petroleum products. According to the NPA (2015), the full deregulation, which was the 
Tema Oil Refinery 
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final stage of Ghana’s petroleum sector deregulation policy, was to result in the cessation 
of subsidies on fuel products.  
Government’s decision to fully deregulate the downstream sector was praised by 
key industry players and civil society organizations, including the National Petroleum 
Authority (NPA) and the ACEP. Benjamin Boakye, the Deputy Executive Director of the 
African Centre for Energy Policy, stated in a press release that ‘‘ACEP commends 
government for taking the decision to deregulate the downstream Petroleum sector.”               
  Explaining the rationale behind the liberalization of the petroleum downstream 
sector, the Chief Executive officer of the National Petroleum Authority (NPA), Mr. 
Moses Asaga, said the full implementation of the deregulation of the petroleum 
downstream sector would promote competition among market players, and the issue of 
colossal subsidies which put a huge financial burden on the government, would also end, 
thereby result in the re-channelling of finances into other sectors of the economy 
(National Petroleum Authority, 2015). 
1.1 History of deregulation policies in Ghana 
According to the IMF (2013), until 2004, the Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) had a 
monopoly on the production and importation of refined oil products in Ghana. Since then, 
deregulation has allowed oil marketing companies (OMCs) to enter the market for 
importing and distribution of crude oil and petroleum products. IMF (2013) further 
revealed that under the current system, a pricing formula exists for all petroleum 
products; and the current price-adjustment mechanism is the result of partial reforms in 
2005.   
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IMF (2011) indicated that under the partial deregulation system, the decision to 
adjust pump prices was at the discretion of the Executive. If the price increases are 
warranted but not implemented, the cost of subsidies is in principle borne by the budget. 
This phenomenon is shown in diagram 1.2 below. 
 
Diagram 1. 2: Major factors that determined prederegulation ex-pump prices of fuel 
                 Source: Researcher’s own drawing 
Note: Some of the institutions pertinent to the deregulation policy and their functions are 
clearly evident in Diagram 1.2. 
 It can be observed that under partial deregulation, the NPA considered taxes, 
levies, subsidies, margins, world fuel prices, and the market exchange rate to set the ex-
pump and ex-refinery prices for the OMCs and Bulk Distribution Companies 
respectively. 
 However, IMF (2011) has indicated that in the past, the Tema Oil Refinery 
(TOR) carried the cost of the subsidy, and underpricing of petroleum products saddled 
TOR with large losses that spilled over into the financial sector in the form of non-
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banking sector at a large budgetary cost. Since October 2010, a hedging scheme using 
call options had also provided some temporary protection against upward movements in 
oil prices. The government purchased monthly call options that generated revenues in the 
event of upside shocks to global oil prices. These revenues were used to cover temporary 
delays in adjusting domestic petroleum product prices to cost-recovery levels.                      
The problems of the partial deregulation exercise such as large budgetary cost, 
underrecoveries, shortages of Dollar supply, and difficulties to issue Letters of Credits by 
the BDCs due to large exposures, and fuel shortages, motivated government to implement 
the full downstream sector deregulation. This phenomenon can be observed in diagram 
1.3 below.
 
Diagram 1. 3: Major factors determining ex-pump prices post full deregulation 
Source: Researcher’s own drawing 
Note: Some of the institutions pertinent to the deregulation policy and their functions are 
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As indicated in the diagram above, the full deregulation exercise called for the 
complete withdrawal of subsidies, hence relieving the NPA of the responsibility to set 
petroleum products prices. Thus the various OMCs set their own prices by considering 
the world price of fuel, taxes, levies, and the exchange rate, for example. 
As has been argued in the literature, stakeholders in the downstream sector have 
argued that the full deregulation policy is sufficient to tackle the challenges faced under 
the partial deregulation exercise. This is not entirely accurate since, for example, the 
government has the power to influence fuel prices through taxation to service debts and 
to meet its commitments like investments in infrastructure. Table 1.1 below captures the 
effects of the latest taxes imposed on premium, gas oil and LPG. 
 
Table 1. 1 : Effects of newly imposed taxes on petroleum products 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2016). 
An analysis by ACEP (2016), however, pointed out that the effects of the levies 
on ex-pump prices are much greater and punitive. ACEP (2016) estimated that the levies 
have led to increase in the ex-pump price of petrol per liter by 33%, 40% on diesel per 
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liter and 22% on LPG per kg. The findings show that the downstream petroleum lacks 
consensus on information. Furthermore, the results also indicate a weakness in 
institutions.  
1.2 Problem statement 
According to the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research [ISSER] 
(2015) indicated that Ghana’s deregulation policy will allow for cost recovery and 
efficiency in the downstream petroleum sector as Bulk Distributions Companies (BDCs) 
and importers will price the commodity according to prevailing market prices to ensure 
that consumers get value for money, as reported by Paintsil (2015). 
However, IMF (2013) has revealed that since the year 2000, governments have 
suspended subsidy reforms, resulting in large fiscal deficits. This recurring phenomenon 
has made any energy reform policy in Ghana ineffective and unsustainable. 
Second, presenting the 2016 budget statement to Parliament in November 2015, 
Finance Minister Seth Terkper submitted that over the nine month period in 2015 
beginning from January 2015, the Ghana cedi depreciated cumulatively by 14.8 percent, 
compared to a much higher depreciation of 31.2 percent in 2014, as reported by Ministry 
of Finance (2015). This phenomenon threatens the deregulation policy, in the 
researcher’s view, since the exchange rate is one of the factors that determine ex-pump 
prices of petroleum products. This currency fluctuation was identified by IMF (2013) as a 
reason for suspending the subsidy reforms in Ghana. The monetary policy of Bank of 
Ghana could partly explain the performance of the exchange rate. 
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 Figure 1.1 below illustrates Bank of Ghana’s exchange rate from 2002 to 2015, 
with the highest (27.50%) and lowest (12.50 %) rates being observed in years 2003, and 
2007 & 2011. Currently, the rate stands at 26.0% (Bank of Ghana, 2016). 
 
Figure 1. 1  The monetary policy rate of the Bank of Ghana from 2002 to 2015 
Source: Bank of Ghana website (2016) 
 Where deregulation fails to yield expected results, the policy could lead to what 
is termed as re-regulation, where several other regulations are reintroduced. Bradburd and 
Ross (1991) broadly defined such a situation in which deregulation ends in the 
formulation and implementation of more regulations than it was before deregulation. The 
tendency to re-regulate arises when there are perceived market failures after the passage 
of deregulation measures. For instance, Bradburd and Ross (1991) observed that there 
had been calls for re-regulation of airline transport in the USA where certain industries 
had been deregulated. These calls had come from partly- and predictably- from those who 
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had experienced losses due to deregulations: airline labor groups, communities that have 
suffered reduced services, business travelers, and travelers on the less densely travel and 
served routes. They have also come from those concerned with the evolution of 
deregulated monopoly or the deregulation of a market with significant market power. 
 Last but not least is the effect of tax components on petroleum products. For 
example, the introduction of taxes on petroleum could reduce the possibilities of 
consumers enjoying falling oil prices due to deregulation, as has happened in Ghana. The 
situation could be worse if international oil prices soar. 
 Therefore, it is the motivation of the author to explore how strengthening 
institutions in Ghana could make the deregulation policy beneficial to the economy. 
1.3 Research questions 
The research focuses on exploring the benefits of strengthening institutions in the 
downstream petroleum sector in the face of the full deregulation policy. Therefore, the 
research has the following questions. 
1. How is the National Petroleum Authority positioned to exercise its role in the 
deregulated petroleum sector? 
2. What is the pass-through effect of Ghana’s exchange rate on domestic prices, and 
why is it challenging for the Bank of Ghana to implement a sound and stable 
exchange rate policy? 
3. What are the key factors accounting for the higher effect of tax components on 
petroleum products, and how do these taxes affect petroleum consumers? 
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4. In what ways do civil society organisations contribute to make the deregulation 
exercise effective and sustainable, and what challenges are faced in the process?  
1.4 Research objectives 
The primary objective of this research is to explore the benefits Ghana would derive 
from strengthening institutions as the deregulation policy takes effect in the downstream 
petroleum sector. Thus the specific objectives are the following. 
1. To investigate the strategic position of National Petroleum Authority in the 
deregulated petroleum downstream sector.  
2. To ascertain the pass-through effect of Ghana’s exchange rate on domestic prices, 
and to identify the challenges faced by the Bank of Ghana in implementing a 
sound and stable exchange rate policy. 
3. To explore the key factors accounting for the high taxes on petroleum products, 
and how these higher taxes affect petroleum consumers. 
4. To investigate ways civil society organisations contribute to make the 
deregulation policy effective and sustainable, and to identify some challenges 
faced in the process. 
1.5 Significance of the research 
First, the results of the research will help policymakers appreciate that 
deregulation is not sufficient; in fact, it may be naïve to deregulate the downstream 
petroleum sector, in anticipation of benefiting from the downstream petroleum sector. A 
lot of other complementary factors need to be considered.  
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There is need to consider other factors because the key stakeholders, particularly 
the government and the National Petroleum Authority (NPA), have stated that the 
deregulation policy would automatically promote fair competition, reduced prices, 
reduced budget deficit.  
Despite this expectation, Stephen and James (2000) have cautioned policymakers 
that a move toward deregulation that does not take the issue of market power seriously 
can undermine the goals of industry restructuring and even, as in the case of England, 
produce a regulatory backlash, as cited from (Stephen Bushnell, 2000). This means that 
the existence of market power under deregulation could create negative externalities, 
unfair competitive practices, and consumer exploitation, which are unintended 
tendencies. Care must be taken in implementing the deregulation policy and effective 
monitoring and capacity building may be needed. 
Second, this research makes the claim that the way forward towards making the 
deregulation policy prospering to the economy is to strengthen institutions, particularly 
economic institutions. For instance, ensuring that the management of the Central Bank is 
independent of the Executive or the Government may be a sound way of strengthening 
institutions.  
Third, the research will help ensure that policymakers commit to full deregulation 
since governments over the years have been suspending subsidy reforms during election 
years. 
Last but not least, the research will add to the body of literature on deregulation 
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and institutions. 
1.6 Theoretical framework 
A 2010 joint report prepared by The International Energy Agency (IEA), 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and World Bank for the June 2010 G-20 Summit 
Meeting, indicated that the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ACMS) provides a definition of subsidy that has been accepted 
by all WTO members. Article 1 of the Agreement states that a subsidy exists when there 
is a financial contribution by a government. The Agreement identifies financial 
contribution as when a government practice involves direct transfer of funds (examples, 
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities 
(example, loan guarantees).  This typically means that a benefit is conferred when the 
financial contribution is provided to the recipient on terms that are more favorable than 
those that the recipient could have obtained from the market. 
Subsidies arise for several reasons. Barany and Grignoyte (2015) found that in 
addition to the impact of subsidies on the price and quantity of fuels used, subsidies also 
have effects on the government, on employment, and on other factors of the economy. 
Barany and Grignoyte (2015) identified the main motivation for subsidizing fuels in most 
countries as a social one, as access to basic energy services raises the living standards of 
the poor. 
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Despite the advantages of subsidies, there is extensive evidence of the distortions 
subsidies create. Barany and Grignoyte (2015) identified that the main motivation for the 
phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies is that they are very costly to the taxpayers, crowd out 
high-priority government expenditure and do not necessarily benefit the target group.  
Citing Sab (2014), Barany and Grignoyte (2015) showed that in Egypt, the lowest income 
quintile captured only 1% of diesel consumption subsidies, while the richest 20% reaped 
over 70% of the benefits. In addition, Barany and Grignoyte (2015) pointed that fuel 
subsidies distort market price signals, and thus investment and consumption decisions, 
leading to an inefficient allocation of resources and lower economic growth in the long 
run. 
As a result of the negative tendencies, a window of opportunity to reform fuel 
subsidies is provided. Barany and Grignoyte (2015) explained that carefully prepared fuel 
subsidies reforms could lead to more robust fiscal positions and contribute to potential 
growth through a reduction in economic distortions and the mitigation of climate change 
due to lower carbon dioxide emissions. 
By estimation, it can be observed that Ghana’s downstream petroleum sector 
deregulation is consistent with the theoretical framework. 
1.7 Cognitive map 
The researcher proposes two cognitive maps: the first shows the how stakeholders 
view the relationship between deregulation and its potential benefits to the Ghanaian 
economy; and the second is the ideal proposal of the researcher. The cognitive map 
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identifies with the available literature on the relationship between deregulation and 
institutions. 
 
Diagram 1. 4 Stakeholders' proposal of the relationship between deregulation and its 
benefits 
Source: Author’s drawing 
From the process flow chart above, it can be observed that with deregulation, the 
downstream petroleum sector would yield the benefits to the actors of the economy, 
government, firms, and the households. That is the expectations of stakeholders would be 
met with the mere implementation of the full deregulation policy. The underlying 
assumptions have limited provision for institutions. This renders the proposal ineffective, 
in the view of the researcher. 
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Diagram 1. 5 Ideal proposal of the relationship between deregulation and its benefits 
 
      Source: Author’s drawing 
Diagram 1.5 introduces institutions, and these institutions would structure incentives and 
allocation of resources in the economy. These institutions ensure justice, fair competition 
and compensations, and distortions in the market are corrected by the institutions.  
1.8 Thesis outline 
       The thesis is organized into five main chapters and they are as observed below. 
Chapter 1: Introduction, in part, presents the general idea of deregulation policies carried 
out in both advanced and developing countries. It also highlights the background, the 
problem statement, the research objectives, the research questions, hypothesis, the 
significance of the project, and the cognitive map. 
Downstream petroleum 
sector: TOR, BDCs,  
OMCs, Final Consumer
Strengthen institutions: 
The Central Bank, the 
Finance Ministry, and 
the NPA 
Deregulate: remove 
subsidies and allow 
market participation
Benefits: fuel efficiency, 
budget deficit decline, 
and sustainability
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Chapter 2: Literature review informs readers of the work done on deregulation, 
institutions and the downstream petroleum sector. It also captures the core messages of 
various schools of thought on deregulation and institutions on other sectors of economies 
in Africa. It especially talks about the allocation of subsidy on petroleum products, and 
how such subsidies are mistargeted. 
Chapter 3: Methodology outlines data collection strategies employed to study the topic 
under review. This chapter addresses the methods followed to understand how Ghana 
could benefit from strengthening institutions. It  focuses more on qualitative data 
collection strategies since the research involves responses from a cross section of 
downstream petroleum sector players, like the NPA, the Central Bank, and the Ministry 
of Finance. 
Chapter 4: Findings and discussions addresses the results obtained from the 
methodology, and the findings are discussed. 
Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations relies on the findings and discussions to 
make recommendations to policymakers on the deregulation policy. 
                                   Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.0 Introduction 
The literature review covers such areas as deregulation theories and their predictions on 
economic performance; implementation of deregulation policies in the international 
context; overview of subsidy allocation in the world; deregulation in the downstream 
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sector in developing countries; overview of deregulation and relevance of institutions; 
and the gap in the literature on deregulation.  
2.1 Deregulation theories and their predictions on economic performance 
The OECD ( 2005, p.114) defined a subsidy as “any measure that keeps prices for 
consumers below market levels, or for producers above market levels or that reduces 
costs for consumers or producers.” There are several types of subsidies such as fuel 
subsidies, food subsidies or energy subsidies depending on the target recipient of the 
subsidy. The IEA (2014, p.315) defined an energy subsidy as “any government action 
directed at the energy sector that lowers the cost of energy production, raises the price 
received  by energy producers or lowers the price paid by energy consumers.” For 
example, according to the Appropriation Act 2015 (Act 901), 1st Schedule-Section 1 of 
the Appropriation Bill for the 2016 financial year, the Finance Ministry issued GHS 
50,000,000.00 in subsidies on the petroleum products that are not deregulated. The 
purpose of this subsidy was to cushion consumers of such products. 
Barany and Grignoyte (2015) pointed out that the concept of energy subsidy is 
regressive. Similarly, Coady (2006), Janvier et al (2010), Edgar et al (2014) and the IMF 
(2013) indicated that energy subsidies promote economic inefficiencies and distortions. 
Barany and Grignoyte (2015) further predicted that an effective deregulation would lead 
to more robust fiscal positions and contribute to potential growth through a reduction in 
economic distortions and the mitigation of climate change. Barany and Grignoyte (2015) 
suggest that a correct deregulation policy could reduce what is known as under-taxation 
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of fuels relative to economically optimal levels, which is also identified as another form 
of subsidy. 
IMF (2013), therefore, emphasized that, when subsidies fail to achieve targets, an 
efficient market decision is to deregulate the sector, hence removing subsidies.  
2.2 Implementation of deregulation policies in the international context 
Deregulation has been practiced by several international economies. For example, 
Harker and Price (2006) pointed out that the government of England reformed the 
English energy sector in the late 1990s to allow market participation. Narrating the result 
of that reform, Stephen and James (2000) argued that the lack of consideration for market 
power undermined the goal of the deregulation policy, leading to a regulatory backlash.  
2.2.1 How subsidies mistargets the poor in Ghana  
      Cooke, Cockburn, Hague, Lahga and Tiberti (2014) estimated that around 70% of 
the benefits from subsidies on gasoline in Africa reach the wealthiest quintile, while just 
2.2% accrue to the poorest quintile, meaning that subsidies are regressive.  Cooke et al 
(2014) found that even for those fuel products that are supposedly ‘pro-poor such as 
kerosene, on average, in Africa, just 16% of the subsidy benefits reach the poorest 
quintile.  Cooke et al (2014) also found that the substantial leakage of subsidy benefits to 
the top income groups means that universal fuel subsidies are an extremely costly 
approach to protecting the welfare of poor households. This reflects the fact that over 97 
out of every 100 dollars of gasoline subsidy “leaks” to the top four quintiles. 
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Table 2. 1 Benefit incidence of fuel subsidies accruing to each quintile (in %) 
Source: Cooke et al (2014) 
 From Table 2.1, it is observed that about 85.55%, 92.8% and 96.5% of LPG, petrol 
and diesel subsidies, respectively, accrue to the richest quintile. However, the poorest 
quintile receives less than 1% of these subsidies. For kerosene, the poorest quintile 
receives 10.69% of the subsidy while the richest quintile receives 36.42%. Meanwhile, 
Table 2.3 below indicates the budget shares of the rich and poor in the Ghana on fuel 
product, expenditure per capita, subsidies per capita and household size for each quintile. 
P a g e 25       EXPLORING THE BENEFITS OF STRONG INSTITUTIONS TO 
GHANA 
 
        25 
 
 
Table 2. 2  Budget shares and per capita subsidy amount per quintile 
Source: Cooke et al (2014) 
       From Table 2.2, as shown by Cooke et al (2014), the budget shares of fuel 
expenditure indicate that the poorest households spend less than 1% of their budget on 
petrol, diesel and LPG. However, they spend the largest share (4.4% of their total 
spending) of all the quintile groups on kerosene.  
    In contrast, the richest quintiles spend the largest share of their budget on diesel, 
petrol and LPG. Although more than a third of the kerosene subsidy accrues to the richest 
group, they spend the lowest share of their budget on kerosene, less than 1%. Thus the 
amount of the subsidy received per capita by quintile shows a similar pattern. For all 
fuels, the amount of subsidy received per capita is higher for the richest households- they 
receive GHS 2.02 per person per year for the diesel subsidy lone.  
     For petrol, the richest households receive almost forty-three times as much subsidy 
per capita than the poor- GHS 7.32 per year compared to just GHS 0.17 for the poorest 
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group. Even for kerosene, used so much more by the poor, the richest households receive 
GHS 3.40 per capita compared to the poor’s GHS 2.05. 
2.2.2 Subsidy and its effect on pollution 
The question of whether subsidy reduction would influence pollution is well 
tackled by the literature. A study by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 1999) found 
that removing consumer subsidies in eight large non-OECD countries could cut their 
carbon dioxide emissions by up to 16%, which would reduce global carbon dioxide 
emissions by nearly 5%.  
On the issue of welfare enhancement, Burniaux, Martin and Oliveira-Martins 
(1992) show the following. 
1. The removal of energy subsidies to consumers in non-OECD countries 
would increase global welfare by $35 billion. 
2.  Removing subsidies will lead to greater fairness, meaning that only 
people who consume a certain good or service pay for it and its affiliated 
environmental costs. 
3.  And a clear, undistorted pricing of goods and services improves economic 
efficiency and national welfare. 
         Furthermore, Parry (2014), referencing National Research Council (2009), State 
Environment Protection Agency of China (2007), World Bank and World Health 
Organization (2013), found that outdoor air pollution, primarily from fossil fuel 
combustion, causes more than 3 million premature deaths a year worldwide, costing 
about 1 percent of GDP for the United States and almost 4% for China.  
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Citing Parry and Small (2009) and World Health Organisation (2013), Parry 
(2014) observed that motor vehicle use leads to crowded roads, accidental death, and 
injuries. Drivers in the London rush hour, for example, impose estimated costs on others 
that are equivalent to about US $10 per liter ($38 per gallon) of the fuel they use through 
their contribution to traffic congestion, and traffic accidents cause an estimated 1.3 
million deaths worldwide. 
The above observations could be summarized in a resolution that was reached by 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] (1999). Suggesting the need to ensure 
energy markets facilitate improvements in energy efficiency, environmental protection, 
and investment in supply infrastructure, APEC (1999) resolved that “the Energy 
Ministers consider reducing energy subsidies progressively and promote implementation 
of pricing practices which reflect the economic cost of supplying and using energy across 
the full energy cycle, having regard to environmental costs.’’ 
2.2.3 Effects of subsidy removal on households and the economy 
 Anand, Coady, Mohammad, Thakoor and Walsh (2013) noted that subsidy removal 
affects households, both directly and indirectly. According to Anand et al (2013), 
typically, the bulk of petroleum is consumed indirectly through household consumption 
of other goods and services that use petroleum products as inputs. Therefore, the welfare 
effect of higher fuel prices—or, equivalently, lower fuel subsidies—on household real 
incomes will depend both on the direct effect of higher prices for petroleum products 
consumed by households and on the indirect effect arising from higher prices for other 
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goods and services consumed by households to the extent that higher petroleum costs are 
passed on to consumer prices. 
2.3 Overview of subsidy allocation in the world 
Stephan Barg (1996) argued that a subsidy is a government-directed, market 
distorting intervention which decreases the cost of producing a specific good or service or 
increases the price which may be charged for it. By this definition, it means that to 
correct such distortions introduced into the market, there is need to remove or modify the 
subsidy. 
The definition above strongly stresses that subsidy is negative, and it is more 
evident in the studies done by scholars. Proving this phenomenon, Myers (1998) 
estimated annual global energy subsidies to be $145 billion, of which $ 110 billion are 
perverse subsidies. Some of this amount is indirect, yet the literature posits that they are 
economically inefficient. For example, Fischer and Toman (1998) pointed out that 
indirect subsidies, which mandate or protect certain technologies, are almost always a 
less efficient policy option compared to policies that penalize polluters, for example, 
through internalization of external costs.  
Bruce (1990) and Myers (1998) documented the following. 
1. Energy subsidies, for example, aggravate governments’ budget deficits 
and divert government funds from other programs with possibly higher 
benefits to the society. 
2. Subsidies produce economic efficiency costs, because resources are 
allocated so as to take advantage of subsidies rather than market 
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profitability. 
3. Subsidies produce equity costs, because they tend to benefit few at the 
expense of many. 
4. And most energy subsidies are harmful to the environment, because they 
support polluting energy technologies, or they encourage increased energy 
consumption. 
2.3.1 Deregulated industries in Africa 
Attention is now drawn to the evidence of the effectiveness of deregulation in 
certain key industries, like the forex exchange market (FOREX), agriculture, the financial 
sector, the telecommunications sector, and others in Africa.  
In the foreign exchange sector, Odubogun (1995) observed that a market 
determined allocation of foreign exchange and the exchange rate is considered necessary 
to an improvement in the competitiveness of the Nigerian economy both internally and in 
its trade and financial transactions with the rest of the world. Odubogun (1995) further 
hinted that the realization of the advantages of the market by an economy depended on 
the functional character of its markets and its public institutions. In a striking observation, 
Odubogun (1995) revealed that there was evidence that in spite of the market reform in 
1986, the naira exchange rate was still not competitively determined and allocation of 
FOREX remains inconsistent with the requirement for the long-term development of the 
Nigerian economy. 
The case of cashew production in Tanzania seems apparent in recognizing that 
deregulation in that sector is incomplete. A case study of the sector by Mwase (1998) 
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recommended that “even though the state had withdrawn from active involvement in 
cashew production and marketing, it could facilitate these activities by removing 
remaining constraints to private sector entry; encouraging formation of small-scale seed 
companies by ‘‘progressive farmers’’ or the informal sector; removing remaining 
restrictions to getting cashew input permits; publicizing and encouraging private trader 
procurement and sale of cashew inputs and outputs; and establishing a comprehensive 
market information system available to all players.’’ 
2.3.2 Empirical reasons for deregulation in Africa 
 In general, economies are deregulated to respond to some perceived distortions that 
are experienced regulated economies, as seen in the above analysis.  More specifically, 
the history of deregulation in Africa seems to have been dictated, in part, by external 
influence other than the market forces of demand and supply.   
  Afeikhena (2002) argued that privatization gained considerable momentum in 
developing countries given its endorsement by the multinational financial institutions as a 
major plank of adjustment policies. Narrating the reform in the telecommunications 
industry in Nigeria, Afeikhena (2002) indicated that the resort to privatization was 
informed by several considerations.  
  First, by 1985, the quantum of resources required to sustain the State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) had become an unbearable burden on the affected nations. 
  Second, Jerome (2002) pointed out that since the beginning of the 1980s, 
privatization of public enterprises has become a major policy tool in both developed and 
developing countries following the apparently successful programmer in Britain. 
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  Jerome (2002) agreed with the conventional thought that the urge for privatization 
was reinforced by the need to reduce government expenditure in the face of burgeoning 
fiscal deficits, and was also in conformity with the resurgence of ‘economic liberalism’ in 
the development literature.  
   The literature on Ghana’s savings from removing subsidy in the past few years is 
revealing. Cooke et al (2014) showed that in 2013, the Ghanaian Government would have 
spent GHS 2.4 billion on fuel subsidies, equaling 3.2% of GDP and more than half of 
Ghana’s allocation to the entire education sector, and that was at a time when the 2012 
budget deficit was near 12%. 
  In a related study, Anand et al (2013) observed that subsidy reduction assists 
governments to increase investments in other sectors. The study revealed that it is 
important to emphasize that the budgetary savings from reducing fuel subsidies can be 
used to increase expenditures in areas that are typically seen as having higher priority, 
example, increasing access to or the quality of education and health services or physical 
infrastructure, or used to reduce taxes.  
2.4 Deregulation in the downstream sector in developing countries 
This session studies the literature on deregulation in the downstream sector in 
developing countries, which includes the effects of rising fuel prices on oil importing 
economies, and the currency performance, inflation and deregulation. 
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2.4.1 Effect of rising fuel prices on oil importing economies 
 Rising oil prices tend to affect not only households and real incomes, it also affects 
the economy as a whole. The following are identified as the effects of rising oil prices on 
mostly oil importing economies, of which Ghana is a member.  
 The results of a model estimations developed by the African Development Bank 
(2009) suggest that high oil prices can have very harmful effects on the economies of 
African oil-importing countries, especially those that are heavily debt-burdened. The 
rising oil prices will lead to a decrease in output and consumption, and to a worsening of 
the net foreign asset position.  
 African Development Bank (2009), citing Dohner (1981), pointed out that a rise in oil 
prices leads to deterioration in the terms of trade of net oil-importing countries, and, 
subsequently, to a fall in the purchasing power of firms and households in net oil-
importing countries.  
 Similarly, citing Loungani (1986), African Development Bank (2009) revealed that if 
oil price increases prevail over a long period, they may lead to a change in the production 
structure in favor of non-oil intensive sectors, which may lead to other distortions. 
 Figure 2.1 below illustrates the behavior of international crude oil prices from 1995-
2013. The figure shows a rising oil price, despite the dip in the price in the first quarter of 
2009. Overall it is observed from Fig 3 that fuel prices have been climbing since 1995. It 
plummeted from over $100 per barrel to less than $50 per barrel in 2010.  Crude oil 
prices reached US$59.82 a barrel in June 2015 and fell further to US$42.46 a barrel in 
September 2015 (Ministry of Finance, 2015). 
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Figure 2. 1 International crude oil prices from 1995 to 2013 
Source: UNICEF, 2014. 
2.4.2 National currency performance and deregulation 
 Identifying that a strong currency is good for economies during oil price increase, 
African Development Bank (2009) indicated that although in some countries oil price 
increases may have been partly offset by exchange rate movements (notably the 
weakening of the U.S. dollar against the euro), it has also had major socioeconomic 
impacts. These results indicate that, in part, rising oil prices under deregulation may not 
require the reintroduction of subsidy if the currency movement is positive. 
  According to Loloh (2014), one macroeconomic variable that is known from 
monetary policy perspective to underpin the behavior of domestic prices is exchange rate. 
Referencing Warjiyo (2013), Loloh (2014) indicates that small open economies like 
Ghana have a particularly peculiar problem because the exchange rate movement may not 
reflect the economic fundamentals due to several factors.  
 Taylor (2000) shows that the inflationary regime of a country could determine the 
pass-through effect monetary shocks on domestic prices. Similarly, Choudhri and Hakura 
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(2001) found that there is strong evidence of a positive and significant association 
between the pass-through and the average inflation rate across countries and periods. 
While Loloh (2014) showed that the conventional wisdom of exchange rate pass-through 
to domestic prices is always highest in “emerging” than in “developed” countries, Hahn, 
Sanchez and Zorzi (2007) overturned the conventional wisdom, based on their three 
alternative vector auto regression models. Hahn et al (2007) asserted that for emerging 
markets with only single digit inflation, pass-through to import and consumer prices is 
found to be low and not very dissimilar from the levels of developed economies. 
2.5 Taxation of petroleum products and deregulation 
  Fuel taxation is another major factor in energy pricing, which is central to the 
definition of energy subsidies and is relevant in the case of Ghana.  
  Coady, Parry, Sears and Shang (2015) suggested that the efficient consumer price for 
an energy product consists of three tax components: the cost of supplying the product to 
the consumer (or opportunity cost), a “Pigouvian” (or “corrective”) tax reflecting the 
environmental costs (or externalities) associated with energy consumption, and (less 
important) a consumption tax reflecting the need to tax all consumption to raise revenue.. 
  In fact, Coady et al (2010) realized that given that energy demand is inelastic and 
that there are negative consumption externalities associated with its use, taxation of 
petroleum products is generally regarded as an efficient way to raise government 
revenue. According to the Ramsey Rule for efficient commodity taxation proposed by 
Ramsey (1927), tax levels across commodities should be inversely proportional to their 
price elasticity of demand in order to minimize the distortion in consumption. In a related 
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study, Crawford et al (2008) extended this theory to suggest that to the extent that 
petroleum consumption is relatively inelastic, taxes should be higher on petroleum 
products. However, Stigliz (2015) proposes that a careful application of Ramsey’s (1927) 
analysis to developing countries must consider the following. 
1. The constraints on taxation 
2. The elasticities of demand and supply 
3. And the structure of the economy. 
Stigliz (2015) submitted that Ramsey’s (1927) analysis assumes perfectively competitive 
markets. 
   The tax policy may be negative, as indicated by Coady et al (2010), suggesting that 
second-best considerations may dilute the argument for relatively high taxation of 
commercial energy. For example, Coady et al (2010) proposed that high energy prices 
may encourage rural households to switch to the use of already overexploited natural 
resources such as fuel wood. Therefore, African Development Bank (2009) suggested 
that high oil prices could be curbed by reducing taxes on the oil products. In many 
European countries, which have high taxes on fuels, such price shocks could potentially 
be mitigated by reducing the taxes as fuel costs rise, as reported by African Development 
Bank (2009).  
  In many African countries, on the contrary, Parry (2014) observed that this option is 
not feasible, as there is, in some cases, limited taxation on oil products in the first place. 
In the case of countries like Ghana, fuel taxation may be a major source of government 
revenue as the informal sector is so large that the government gets significant tax revenue 
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from indirect rather than direct taxation. Parry (2014) found that energy prices in many 
countries may be wrong in the sense that they do not reflect market fundamentals nor 
recognize externalities. As a result, Parry (2014) suggested the following taxes on fuel 
products.  
1. A tax charge on fossil fuels in proportion to their CO2 emissions multiplied by the 
global damage from those emissions. 
2. Additional charge on fuels used in power generation, heating, and by other 
stationary sources in proportion to the local air pollution emissions from these 
fuels but with credits for demonstrated emissions capture during fuel combustion, 
given that net emissions released are what determine environmental damage. 
3. And an additional tax for local pollution, congestion, accidents, and pavement 
damage attributable to motor vehicles.  
2.5.1 Price adjustment challenges prior to full deregulation in Ghana 
The administration of the publicly released price-adjustment formula was 
transferred to the newly established National Petroleum Agency (NPA), according to 
IMF (2013). According to IMF (2013), the delegation of regulatory powers to the NPA 
was meant to isolate the decision to adjust prices from political intervention. In the wake 
of the 2007–08 global fuel and food crisis and in the run-up to the 2008 elections, 
however, automatic adjustment was temporarily suspended. Similar suspensions have 
been observed over the past two decades, as can be found in Fig 2.2 below, as reported by 
IMF (2013). 
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Figure 2. 2 Ghana: Fuel price developments, 2000-2012 
Source: National Petroleum Authority, and IMF staff estimates (2013) 
Fig 2.2 indicates that subsidy reforms are suspended mostly in election years even in the 
face of rising import costs, as can be observed in years 2004 and 2008. 
The IMF (2013) referencing (IMF, 2012a, b) pointed out that the NPA remained 
the main regulatory agency and published the price adjustments required for cost 
recovery on a biweekly basis. When an upward price adjustment had been required in 
recent years, the shortfall had often been covered by the budget or more recently by 
hedging profits. This had resulted in infrequent and large price adjustments, when 
hedging profits were exhausted and the fiscal burden became too onerous. Prices were 
adjusted twice in 2011, by 30 percent in January and 15 percent in December. Prices had 
not been adjusted in 2012 (with the exception of a small downward adjustment early in 
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the year) and the gap between domestic and global oil prices, exacerbated by a 
depreciating currency, has increased substantially.   
The recent full deregulation policy has seen OMCs setting their own prices (Joy 
Online, 2015). Fig 2.3 and Table 2.3 below display ten OMCs and their quoted prices for 
both Petrol and Diesel. 
 
Table 2. 3 Ten oil marketing companies and their quoted prices for petrole and diesel 
Source: Chamber of Petroleum Consumers Ghana (2015) 
 
Figure 2. 3 Best ten oil marketing companies and their quoted prices for petrol and diesel 
Source: Chamber of Petroleum Consumers Ghana (2015). 
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Both Table 2.3 and Fig 2.3 indicate that Allied Oil quoted the lowest price for Petrol and 
Diesel while SO Energy quoted the highest price for both products. That suggests that 
OMCs are now attracting consumers with their prices and marketing strategies because of 
the competition in the industry. 
2.6 Overview of deregulation and relevance of institutions 
North (1990, p.3) defined institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. North 
(1990) further indicated that institutions structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social, or economic.  
Similarly, Acemoglu and Johnson (2004) reiterated and revalidated the roles that 
institutions play in development, by clearly specifying the characteristics of weak 
institutions to include the following: 
1. Unfettered power conferred on the leadership of the country or the 
executive 
2. Weak enforcement of the rule of law 
3. Weak enforcement of property rights 
4. Ineffective land tenure system 
5. Lack of equality of opportunities for majority of the population.  
 For the purpose of this research, emphasis is placed on the unfettered power of 
the executive, which is the strength of political institutions. This is because North (1990) 
indicates that political institutions determine economic institutions and economic 
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performance both directly and indirectly. For their direct effect, he asserts that if political 
institutions place all political power in the hands of the a single individual or a small 
group, economic institutions that provide protection of property rights and equal 
opportunity for the rest of the population are difficult to sustain. This effect is exactly 
what Ghana faces: the 1992 Constitution of Ghana permits the President to appoint the 
head and other sensitive officers of all institutions like the Bank of Ghana, the National 
Petroleum Authority, Tema Oil Refinery, and other critical institutions. It is not 
surprising that the Bank of Ghana struggles to ensure a stable and sound monetary policy, 
resulting from its regular financing of government deficit.  
Appendix 1 below illustrates some of the strategies employed by Ghana to protect 
the poor as a contrast to subsidies that do not reach the vulnerable (Edgar F.A. Cook, 
2014). From Appendix 1, it can be observed that potentially well targeted programs 
include the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP), the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and Free School uniforms for primary schools in poor areas.  
Some scholars have strongly advocated for the complete removal of the 
government from the market even in the face of market failure, while others recommend 
gradual removal of the government. For instance, Stigliz (1989) profoundly asserts that 
the fact that markets face certain problems does not in itself justify government 
intervention; it only identifies the potential areas for it. The government is likely to face 
similar [imperfect information] problems if it intervenes. However, Atingi-Ego (2003) 
disagrees, positing that financial liberalization requires as a pre-condition that fiscal 
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discipline on the part of Government prevails. 
2.7 The gap in the literature on deregulation 
 The strand of literature on deregulation also focuses on the reform needed to bring 
about economic progress after deregulation. However, a careful scrutiny of the literature 
reveals that there is insufficient clarity on the role of financial institutions on a 
deregulated sector, for instance. More specifically, it is observed that the deregulation 
observed in Britain was successful (Jerome, 2002). But the unanswered question is, how 
critical was the British currency to the deregulation? Much of the studies focused on the 
sector that was deregulated, with little emphasis on the role of currency and taxation on 
the deregulation, for example.  
 In the case of Ghana, it is thus critical to analyze how the performance of the Cedi is 
critical to the success of the downstream full petroleum sector deregulation, for example. 
This is because with a rapidly depreciating Cedi, for example, Ghanaians would still 
purchase fuel at higher prices if the world price of fuel drops, which is a distortion. On 
the other hand, higher taxes on the petroleum products for the purposes of meeting other 
commitments, could make the energy reform ineffective.  
Though Thomas Klitgaard and Rekha Reddy (2000) hinted on the relationship 
between a deregulated electricity sector in California and the financial sector, their 
research was too narrow to be relied on for sufficient understanding.  
In conclusion, the available literature written by IMF (2013) and Cook et al 
(2014) proposes strategies to curb the adverse effects of subsidy reform on the poor, 
forever. However, the literature does not tackle how the cause of the negative effects. As 
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such the literature is silent on the role of institutions on a deregulated sector. This thesis 
fills the gap in the literature. 
                                             Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Overview of Methodology 
This part of the research focuses on the methods employed to undertake the 
research. This also includes the instruments used in the information gathering process. 
The methodology describes the population and procedures used in exploring the benefits 
of strengthening institutions to the economy of Ghana. The research design is shown 
below. 
3.2 Research Design 
For any investigation, the selection of an appropriate research design is crucial in 
enabling one to arrive at valid findings, comparisons and conclusions (Ranjit, 2011).  
Ranjit (2011) emphasizes that the strength of an empirical investigation is primarily 
evaluated in the light of the research design. Research design may, therefore, refer to the 
structure of an enquiry.  
According to Maree (2007), a research is a plan that moves from the underlying 
philosophical assumptions to specifying the selection of respondents, the data gathering 
techniques to be used and the data analysis to be done.  
Similarly, Taylor (2000) defines research designs as constructed plans or 
strategies that are developed to seek and discover answers to research questions. The 
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purpose of this research design is to minimize the tendency to draw incorrect causal 
interferences from data collected.  
There are two kinds of research approaches: quantitative research and qualitative 
research. This study, however, is qualitative in its approach. Qualitative research usually 
aids the researcher to obtain an in-depth understanding of events. Thus the study employs 
qualitative techniques because it seeks to gain understanding of the deregulation exercise 
in the downstream petroleum sector (Key, 1997). 
It is also important to mention that qualitative research is preferred to quantitative 
research in this context because quantitative research seeks to find a precise or exact 
measurement while qualitative research is subjective, using the researcher’s interpretation 
of results. Relying on this logic, the research follows the case study design approach. 
According to Leedy (1993) and Anderson (1993), the case study design deals with 
contemporary events and is concerned with how and why things happen.  
The main advantage of the case study is its ability to probe deeply, analyze 
intensively and get an in-depth and detailed understanding of the phenomenon under 
review (Cohen and Manion, 1994; Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2006; Creswell, 2007; 
Denscombe, 2001; and Wimmer and Maree, 2007). This justifies the research design.  
Even though critics argue that the case study approach lacks internal reliability as 
another researcher might come to a differing conclusion (Anderson, 1993), the 
incorporation of multiple data sources in the study such as individual interviews, focus 
group discussions, observations, and documentary analysis improves internal reliability 
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since conclusions suggested by different data sources are far stronger than those 
suggested by one source (Tichapondwa, 2013). 
3.3 Research scope  
This research focuses on Ghana’s downstream petroleum sector deregulation 
exercise. The population and study area are explained in the next session. 
3.3.1 Study population 
The population of the study will consist mainly of individuals in the downstream 
petroleum sector who have in-depth understanding of the deregulation policy. The 
individuals in this sector together with those who work in the target institutions are 
selected because they understand the dynamics of the industry, and they play critical roles 
in the sector. 
3.3.2 Study area 
The Ghana’s petroleum downstream sector is selected for this study because it is 












The Bank of Ghana 
(Exchange rate)
Diagram 3. 1 Interactions between the three major nation l institutions in the 
petroleum downstream sector 
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Source: Researcher’s drawing 
Diagram six shows that, to set indicative ex-pump prices, for example, the NPA considers 
taxes, levies, margins, and the exchange rate.  
3.4 Sampling Strategy 
Different qualitative sampling strategies may be considered at different stages, 
and this is informed by questions regarding the research objectives, target population, 
sample techniques, and sample size. 
3.4.1 Sampling techniques 
       Purposive sampling method is selected for this research because of the knowledge 
and expertise of the respondents making them suitable for the study (Sarantakos, 2005). 
This method allows the researcher to choose respondents who are relevant to the 
research. It is appropriate because it is complex collecting information from all subjects 
who comprise the total population. That means that this method helps to eliminate those 
who do not meet the requirements of the study. The drawback to this method is its 
subjectivity, making the researcher choose being convenient or objective. It also creates 
bias because it makes the researcher select certain individual respondents within the 
quotas (Sarantakos, 2005). 
3.4.2 Sample size 
       According to Ranjit (2011), qualitative research data is usually collected to a point 
where one is not getting new information or it is negligible- the data saturation point. 
This stage determines the sample size. Therefore, the sample size preferred by the 
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researcher is seven (7) individuals from seven institutions who have appreciable 
knowledge in the deregulation policy. This requires sound selection of the respondents 
who will be ready and available to allow in-depth data and collection. 
3.5 Data collection 
         The data to be collected will be from primary sources, with little support from 
secondary sources. Primary data will be collected from officials of the Finance Ministry, 
Central Bank, NPA, ACEP, Imani Ghana, and some prominent economists in Ghana. The 
secondary data will be collected from websites of key industry players, particularly the 
Central Bank. 
3.5.1 Data collection instruments 
The appropriate instruments for this research include interviews and analyses of 
documents. Tichapondwa (2010) citing Borg and Gall (1996) and Denscombe (2001) 
pointed out that interviews involve the collection of data through direct contact between 
the researcher and the respondents presumed to have certain experiences that enhance in-
depth understanding of the problem under investigation.  
Tichapondwa (2010), citing Patton (1990), argued that the purpose of 
interviewing is to find out what is in someone’s mind and to depict the respondent’s 
perceptions and experiences about a phenomenon under review. 
Some advantages of semi-structured interview include flexibility, adaptability, 
and provision of direct human interaction that enables the researcher to probe and clarify 
answers with the respondents, follow-up leads, elaborate on original response and obtain 
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more data with greater detail and clarity, as Tichapondwa (2010) revealed from Borg and 
Gall (1996), Creswell (2007), Nachmias & Nachmias (1998) and Schurick (1990). The 
disadvantage is that this method is costly relative to questionnaires, and this promotes 
subjectivity and possible bias emanating from the eagerness to please the interviewer or 
the tendency by the interviewer to seek out answers that support their preconceived 
notions Tichapondwa (2010). 
3.5.2 Data collection procedure 
Responses from respondents were recorded using phones and notes were taken for 
emphasizes. Follow up was made on those respondents for clarifications. This also 
involved exchange of emails. 
It is important to mention that respondents were provided a consent form, in order 
to adhere to the appropriate research ethics. 
3.5.3 Data preparation, collation and processing 
The research employed diagrams, figures and tables to prepare and process the 
data to be received from the research. For data collation, this research involved the use of 
electronic devices and recording materials. The objective was to ensure data integrity. 
3.6 Data analysis 
         In data analysis, discussion and descriptive methods were used. Tables and charts 
were employed to serve as additional tools to summarize the data. This is expected to aid 
interpretation and understanding of the analysis. 
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3.7 Validity and reliability 
         Ranjit (2011) emphasized that validity in the broader sense refers to the ability of a 
research instrument to demonstrate that it is finding out what the researcher designed it 
to. Reliability, on the other hand, refers to the consistency in its findings when used 
repeatedly (Ranjit, 2011). 
         According to Ranjit (2011), Denzin and Lincoln (1994) provided a framework of 
four criteria as part of the constructivism paradigm paralleling “validity” and “reliability” 
in quantitative research. There are two set of criteria “for judging the goodness or quality 
of an inquiry in constructivism paradigm” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). These are 
trustworthiness and authenticity. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) revealed that  
trustworthiness in qualitative study is determined by four indicators- credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability- and it is these four indicators that reflect 
validity and reliability in qualitative research. Ranjit (2011), citing Trochim and Donnelly 
(2007), compared the criteria proposed by Guba and Lincoln in the following table with 
validity and reliability as defined in quantitative research:                 
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                According to Trochim and Donnelly (2007), credibility involves establishing 
that the results of qualitative research are credible from the perspective of the participant 
in the research. Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative 
research can be generalized to other contexts or settings; dependability is concerned with 
whether one would obtain the same results if the researcher could observe the same thing 
twice; and confirmability refers to the degree to which the results could be confirmed by 
others (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007). 
               Therefore, these four indicators guided the methodology to promote validity and 
reliability. 
3.8 Ethical considerations 
         The following ethical issues were considered in the highest standards. This included 
ethical issues with respect to the participants: data collection practices, consent seeking, 
incentive provisions, seeking sensitive information, possibility of causing harm to 
participants, and maintaining confidentiality. Incentive provision was treated according to 
practices prescribed by Ashesi University College. Ethical issues concerning the 
researcher was also be respected: avoiding bias, using appropriate research methodology, 
correct reporting, and appropriate use of information received from respondents. 
3.9 Limitations and delimitations 
             The limitations of this study were largely experienced in the data collection stage. 
The market is driven by profit making individuals. This incentive may have influenced 
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how much data the Association of Oil Marketing Companies volunteered, for example. 
That will be an issue of honesty.  
             Second, the full deregulation exercise in Ghana is just about ten (10) months 
since the market was deregulated. This short time period made it difficult to ascertain the 
success of the deregulation exercise. 
             Again, little consideration was given to household consumers, industries that rely 
on petroleum products, and others that are not policymakers. This is because the aim of 
the research is to focus on the policy directions of the deregulation exercise, which would 
yield the expected gains by the market. Again, little consideration is given to the effect of 
world price of fuel. This is essentially because, in the short term, Ghana has little to do to 
influence the world fuel price. 
          Further, I prepare to accept a reasonable delay in the collection of the response. 
People were usually reluctant to offer information that were needed within a short time.  
          Nevertheless, the researcher was determined to be resilient in committing efforts in 
the data collection process. The researcher also did extensive studies to gather sufficient 
data online to supplement the study. 
                                   Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion 
4.0 Introduction 
           The analysis of the responses from the different respondents, including National 
Petroleum Authority, Africa Centre for Energy Policy, Association of Oil Marketing 
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Companies, Imani Ghana, and the Institute of Economic Affairs, the petroleum 
downstream industry revealed that the petroleum downstream petroleum sector is 
progressively competitive due to the deregulation exercise. The competition is most 
intense amongst the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) and Liquefied Petroleum 
Marketing Companies (LPGMCs), since there are about 3100 OMC/LPGMC outlets in 
the industry. The specific findings and discussions presented below follow the order of 
the research questions. 
4.1 The strategic position of the NPA 
The first research objective is to investigate the strategic position of the National 
Petroleum Authority with the aim of finding institutional challenges facing the regulator. 
The following are the evidence supporting the strategic position of the NPA. 
The findings indicate that after full price liberalization, the role of the National 
Petroleum Authority’s (NPA’s) role has shifted from setting of the prices of petroleum 
products to monitoring and ensuring that Petroleum Service Providers (PSPs) set prices in 
accordance with the Prescribed Petroleum Pricing Formula.  
The NPA, however, continues to set the prices for Premix Fuel, Residual Fuel Oil 
(RFO), Aviation Turbine Kerosene (ATK), Marine gasoil for foreign vessels, Gasoil for 
the Mines and the Rig. This indicates that the government is still interfering in the market 
for those particular products. 
The NPA monitors quality by the application of the Petroleum Product Marking 
Scheme (PPMS), which involves the introduction of a bio-chemical liquid into the 
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petroleum product at the loading depots prior to delivery of products to the retail outlet. 
The results show that the PPMS is applied twice: it is first applied at the point of arrival 
of the products at the port, and the depots before the OMCs load the products for 
delivery. 
The findings revealed that the NPA has implemented the Unified Petroleum 
Pricing Fund (UPPF) scheme that ensures there is regular supply of products to all parts 
of the country irrespective of geographical location. This UPPF has an element that 
represents as near as possible the actual cost of distribution. Further to this, the UPPF 
sees to it that petroleum products are efficiently transported throughout the country in a 
manner that is simple, effective and inexpensive to operate. 
Regarding the monitoring of prices by the NPA, the OMCs/LPGMCs and BDCs 
set and submit their indicative ex-pump prices and ex-refinery prices two days before 
every two weeks-the pricing window- which are then examined and approved by the 
NPA. To set such prices, they follow the Prescribed Petroleum Pricing Formula which is 
shown in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. Appendix 2 shows how the BDCs and refineries 
calculate their price, which is then taken by the OMCs. For example, to calculate the ex-
refinery prices, the BDCs consider the price of crude, the freight on board prices, foreign 
exchange rates, and taxes. After determining their prices of the imported products, the 
various OMCs accept the ex-refinery prices set by their BDCs, and that informs their 
pricing strategies by considering the various taxes, levies, and margins. This is shown in 
Appendix 3. 
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According to the NPA, it has taken necessary measures to prevent the formation 
of cartels, monopolies and unfair competition. Mechanisms that allow OMCs to secure 
guarantees from reputable banks that will pay their bills when they default in the paying 
the BDCs have been put in place by the NPA. There is also complaints settlement 
committee put in place by the NPA. These measures are intended to improve competition 
in supply, production, and distribution of products. 
To monitor prices set by OMCs, the Authority continues to ensure that OMCs and 
BDCs do not take undue advantage of consumers, by ensuring that they set their prices in 
accordance with the Prescribed Petroleum Pricing Formula. By this, the NPA ensures that 
ex-prices of an OMC or LPGMC must remain the same at all its retail outlets throughout 
the country within any particular period, avoiding variation of ex-pump prices across the 
country. 
The NPA also monitors the stocks of petroleum products on a regular basis, and 
plans the importation of petroleum products to avoid shortage of petroleum products on 
the market. 
In a related development, the Parliament of Ghana has passed the National 
Petroleum Authority Act 2015 (Act 691). The passage of the Act has settled the legal 
battle threatened against it by certain persons in Ghana, including the Minority Members 
of Parliament. That legal battled was to force the reversal of the deregulation exercise 
since the NPA was legally tasked by National Petroleum Act, 2005 (Act 691) to set 
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petroleum products and not the market players. As a result, the amendment has increased 
the sustainability of the deregulation policy because of the rise in confidence in the 
deregulation exercise. This is because the amendment has ensured that the National 
Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 (Act 691) is aligned with the full deregulation of the 
downstream sector. 
4.1.1 The deregulation policy on the performance of the OMCs 
It is observed that the OMCs now set their own ex-pump prices according to the 
Prescribed Petroleum Pricing Formula and ensure that all the retail outlets under their 
sponsorship sell petroleum products at their set prices. Each OMC now is allowed to set 
its own marketers’ and dealers’ margins. 
According to the NPA, as at September 2015, there were 139 OMCs operating in 
the petroleum downstream sector. Using 2015 data to find the concentration of the 139 
member OMCs market after the deregulation, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the top 
four firms (Ghana Oil Company Limited, Shell, Total Petroleum Ghana Limited, and Star 
Oil Company Limited) is 0.06, which suggests the market is highly competitive.  
Figure 4.1 below shows the nine major OMCs with market shares of more than 
1% each as at September 201. Ghana Oil Company Limited (GOIL) was the market 
leader with 15% of the market share. 
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Figure 4. 1 Market shares of major OMCs as at September 2015 
Source: NPA and author’s drawing  
Meanwhile, using 2014 data to find the concentration of the top four firms (Shell, 
Ghana Oil Company Limited, Total, and Star Oil Company Limited) prior to full 
deregulation, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is 0.054, which indicates a higher 
competiveness relative to the 2015 Index. Figure 4.2 below shows the major OMCs as at 
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Figure 4. 2 Market shares of major OMCs as at December 2014 
Source: NPA and author’s drawing 
Similarly, Figure 4.3 below shows the major OMCs as at December 2013, where 
Total Petroleum was the market leader with 14%. 
 



























































































































































































Oil Marketing Companies and their market shares at 
December 2013
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Source: NPA and author’s drawing 
As at the end of 2013, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the top four firms (Total 
Petroleum Company Limited, Shell, Ghana Oil Company Limited, and Star Oil) stood at 
0.049. That indicated a higher competiveness relative that of 2014.   
4.1.2 The deregulation policy on the performance of the BDCs 
        The results also indicate that as at September 2015, of the 30 BDCs licensed by the 
NPA, GO Energy Company Limited was the market leader with 17.49% market share. 
This can be seen in Figure 4.4 below. 
 
Figure 4. 4 Market shares of major BDCs as at September 2015 
Source: NPA and author’s drawing 
          Using 2015 data available at the NPA website to find the concentration of the 130 
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four firms (GO Energy, Fueltrade, Ebony, and Chase) shows 0.069. This indicates a 
highly competitive market relative to the previous year.  Even though it is too early, one 
could argue that the deregulation exercise may be an explanatory variable. Interestingly, 
this result differs sharply with the responses from the civil society organisations and the 
Organisation of Oil Marketing Companies. It was suggested that there is not a large 
competition in the BDCs market. 
            As at the end of 2014, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was 0.074 for the top four 
firms (Fueltrade, Vihama, Cirrus, and Chase). This shows a marginal improvement in the 
market competiveness relative to the previous year. Similarly, the 2014, the market 
leadership situation was different. According to Figure 4.5 below, Fuel Trade was the 
leader with 18.59% market share. 
 
Figure 4. 5 Market shares of major BDCs as at end of 2014 
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2014
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Meanwhile, the market outcome by the end of 2013 was also different, where 
Cirrus was the leader with 18.86% market share, as seen in Fig 4.6. 
 
Figure 4. 6 Market share of BDCs as at end of 2013 
Source: NPA and author’s drawing 
             Interestingly, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 2013 was 0.098 which meant a 
lack of concentration. 
4.1.3 The nature of the petroleum consumption in the downstream industry 
Using 2010 data from the NPA, Table 4.1 below illustrates national consumption 
of petroleum products, which suggests that overall Gasoil (Diesel) was the most utilized 
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Table 4. 1 Percentage consumption of petroleum products in 2010 
Source: NPA (2010) 
 
         Similarly, Appendix 4 shows the consumption of petroleum products is to rise 
rapidly on the back of economic growth, according to the NPA.  As indicated by Figure 
4.1 above, the NPA estimates that the gap between total demand and the local refinery 
capacity through Tema Oil Refinery will continue to grow and more imports of refined 
products will, therefore, be required. 
4.1.4 Petroleum products produced by the domestically in Ghana 
Fig. 4.7 depicts the percentage spread of products produced by TOR in the year 
2010. Gasoline  is in the lead with 32.45%, Gas Oil follows with 31.03% and then ATK 
with 12.73%. The rest of the products such as Fuel oil, LPG, Premix and Kerosene had a 
total of 24%. 
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Figure 4. 7 Percentage of products produced by TOR 
Source: NPA (2010) 
4.1.5 Petroleum products imported in 2010 
The lack of current data on petroleum products explain why 2010 data are used. 
Figure 4.8 below depicts the market share of Gas Oil (54.83%), Gasoline (35.86%) and 
LPG (9.31%) imported into the country. The high proportion of Gas Oil imported and 
produced in the country  indicate that economic activities were vibrant in the year under 
review. It also presupposes that with deregulation, this volume of import is more likely to 
increase significantly. 
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Figure 4. 8  Percentage of products imported by BDCs in 2010 
Source: NPA (2010) 
4.1.6 Historical supply of petroleum products 
Analysed available data from the NPA shows that total national supply of 
petroleum products increased steadily from 1999 to 2013, until the economy faced sharp 
decline in supply in 2014, possibly due to the many problems associated with government 
intervention in the market. This phenomenon is illustrated on Figure 4.9 below. It is not 
surprising that a year after that decline, the government undertook the full price 
liberalisation policy, seeking to tackle the deficit, and to encourage market competition in 
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Figure 4. 9 Trend of national supply of petroleum products in Ghana prior to 
deregulation 
Source: NPA (2010) and author’s drawing 
4.1.7 Distribution of petroleum product consumption per Region 
         Figure 4.9.1 below indicates that the Greater Accra Region consumed the highest 
volume of petroleum products between 2010 and 2014, with the Ashanti Region being 
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Figure 4.10 Volume of all products consumed per Regions of Ghana 
Source: NPA (2010) and author’s drawing 
4.1.8 Institutional challenge I: The strategic position of the NPA in monitoring the BDCs 
and BDCs 
The first research objective was to find the institutional challenges facing the 
NPA. Thus the following are the unfortunate institutional challenges identified.  
1. Monitoring product quality twice at the ports and depots, and conducting field 
search twice a year by the NPA, raises concerns about quality at the outlets, 
especially when there are over 3100 outlets in Ghana.  
2. According to the NPA, the commercial production of gas in Ghana has 
increased the responsibilities of the NPA. For example, with the operation of 
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capacity building to regulate, monitor, and inspect the quality of the products 
being produced. 
3. Product adulteration has fallen to 1.2% in 2014 from 32% in 2013, according 
to the NPA. This indicates the industry is still not 100% free of adulteration, 
confirming the presence of externalities due to deregulation. 
4. On whether the NPA is independent to resist attempts by the government to 
reintroduce subsidies, especially during elections, the results indicate 
government has the power to use a certificate of urgency to alter market 
outcomes when oil prices are soaring. This is especially strong because there 
is a political cost to allowing oil price pass-through during election years. This 
tendency is what the North (1990) calls the “unfettered power of the 
Executive,” as highlighted by Acemoglu and Johnson (2004). 
5. Unfortunately, another challenge threatening the sustainability of the full price 
deregulation is the lack of adequate capacity of some PSPs (especially the 
OMCs and LPGMCs) to set their prices, according to the NPA. This is 
because these OMCs and LPGMCs do not have the competencies in setting 
their ex-pump prices, possibly due to managerial ineffectiveness and other 
challenges. This is especially observed among the filling stations and resellers. 
On the other hand, the well-resourced OMCs are the service stations. 
6. Even though the time is too short to determine the effectiveness of the 
deregulation exercise on competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the 
four big OMCs after deregulation indicates that the market’s competiveness 
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has declined marginally. This confirms the IMF findings that it takes time to 
realize the results of energy reform. 
7. Since the deregulation exercise was passed, there has only been substantial 
declines in world oil prices, which has reflected in domestic prices of fuel, 
except that taxes reduced the benefits thereof to consumers. As a result, it is 
hard to conclude that OMCs are able to pass the full cost of oil price to 
consumers. 
8. The results revealed that the OMCs and civil society organizations find the 
deregulation exercise incomplete because it does not consider the 
demographics of consumers. That is, an ex-pump price set by GOIL service 
station at Kanda, Accra, is the same for Adu-suazo, a village in Half-Assini. 
This makes it difficult to attract higher margins in Accra where purchasing 
power is relatively higher. Alternatively, people of lower income levels are 
required to purchase the same liter at a price as the rich. The researcher finds 
this uneconomic. 
9. The findings also revealed that the price rigidity introduced by the NPA 
makes the deregulation exercise incomplete. That is, the OMCs cannot 
determine their own margins without approval from the NPA.  
10. The findings further revealed that there is the Association of Oil Marketing 
Companies, consisting about 120 OMCs. The results could not indicate 
whether this association has the tendency to influence market outcomes. 
Especially when the market is deregulated to prevent collusion and 
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cartelization, the researcher thinks this could fuel market inefficiencies like 
price manipulation, collusions, and other practices. 
4.2 The pass-through of Ghana’s exchange rate shocks 
          The second objective of this research sought to first ascertain the pass-through 
effect of Ghana’s exchange rate movement on petroleum prices. Therefore, sessions 4.2-
4.2.3 provide evidence to support this objective. 
           From the Bank of Ghana’s research and estimates illustrated by Figure 4.9.6 and 
Table 4.6 below, it is observed that the estimated cumulative pass-through coefficients 
point to the fact the effect of a nominal exchange rate shock on domestic prices are 
incomplete and broadly modest and fade within 18-24 months, but such impacts are 
mostly felt within 12 months.  
            The research was done using a recursive VAR to estimate the pass-through impact 
of exchange rate movements on domestic prices between January 1994 and December 
212. For example, it can be seen from Figure 4.11 that within the first three months of an 
exchange rate shock, the pass-through to non-food and CPI inflation were 13.3% and 
6.5% respectively. On the other hand, as prices are adjusted over time to reflect the 
exchange rate movements, the pass-through rises steadily to 23.2% and 13.9% for non-
food and CPI respectively within six months. It could be said that the impact of the 
exchange rate shock disappears completely after 36 months as the pass-through tapers off 
at 36.3% and 26.7% for non-food inflation and CPI inflation respectively (Bank of 
Ghana, 2014). 
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Figure 4. 10 Estimated cumulated pass-through coefficients 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2014) 
 
Table 4. 2 Estimated cumulated pass-through coefficients 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2014) 
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4.2.1 Effect of Ghana’s exchange rate pass-through on petroleum prices 
 This part provides further evidence to support the first objective. This session 
identifies the exchange rate movement with particular emphasis on petroleum prices. 
      The Bank of Ghana (2014) estimates that generally the impact of the exchange rate 
shock on Ghana’s CPI is more benign than for non-food inflation. This phenomenon is 
due to several explanations. First, this might be due to the fact that non-food inflation 
contains a greater share of tradable goods and services compared to CPI inflation. 
         The Bank also identifies that it is possible that producers do not have the pricing 
power to fully adjust their prices to reflect the exchange rate shock, thereby forcing profit 
margins to contract in order to absorb the exchange rate shock with consumer prices 
minimally impacted, a situation that is not conducive for investment, growth and 
employment generation, implying that a stable currency is a necessary pre-requisite for 
sustainable growth.  
         In contrast to the pass-through coefficients, the Bank uses another tool -variations 
decomposition-that helps to assess the importance of exchange rate shocks in explaining 
the behavior of non-food and CPI inflation. Alternatively, relying on their estimations 
illustrated by Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below, the Bank has found that in line with empirical 
regularity and consistent with the pass-through coefficients estimates, the effect of the 
exchange rate shock on CPI inflation fluctuations is more benign than for non-food 
inflation. From Table 4.9.4, only about 7% of the variation of CPI inflation is explained 
by the exchange rate shock, non-food inflation innovations account for about 58%, own-
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innovations explain about 30% while the remainder of the variation is explained the other 
variables.  
 
Table 4. 3 Variance decomposition of non-food inflation 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2014) 
 
Table 4. 4 Variance of decomposition of non-food inflation 
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Source: Bank of Ghana (2014) 
           According to the Bank of Ghana (2014), oil prices explain just a minimal variance 
in non-food and CPI, and this reflects non-automatic adjustment in domestic ex-pump 
price of oil to reflect conditions in the international market. The Bank expected that the 
regular application of the automatic adjustment formula with exchange rate movements 
as one of its underlying triggers will increase oil price’s contribution to the variance of 
domestic prices. This phenomenon effectively signals that the price liberalization is a 
fertile ground for higher variations contributed by oil. 
4.2.2 Bank of Ghana’s perceived challenges in implementing sound monetary policy 
    This session identifies specific challenges the Bank of Ghana perceives to be 
faced with while implementing sound monetary policy. 
   Results obtained from the Bank of Ghana indicate that the Bank faces various 
challenges while seeking to implement a sound and stable monetary exchange rate. The 
central bank alone cannot stabilize the cedi. It is the entire spectrum of macroeconomic 
policy that will together stabilize the cedi (Bank of Ghana, 2016). Key among the 
challenges include the following. 
1. The rising expectations of consumers, businesses, banking sector players. 
2. The inflationary environment. 
3. Fiscal imbalances resulting from structural deficiencies in the economy, like 
trade imbalances, declining revenues, rising government deficit to GDP. 
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4. Excessive and persistent lending to the government as mandated by Bank of 
Ghana Act, 2002 (Act 612) (Bank of Ghana, 2016). 
         Bank of Ghana Monetary Policy Committee Press Releases over the past four years 
indicate that the Bank of Ghana identifies these challenges to be impeding the efforts of 
BoG in restoring monetary discipline. As part of measures to restore the health of the 
monetary system, in February 4, 2014, the Bank issued three notices on: operations of 
foreign exchange accounts (FEA) and foreign currency accounts (FCA), repatriation of 
export proceeds, and additional operating procedures for Forex Bureaux in Ghana.  
            Consequently, the challenges of the macroeconomic environment forced the Bank 
to revise those measures in June 13, 2014 (Bank of Ghana, 2014). 
4.2.3 Measures in restoring the health of the monetary policy 
          In the view of the Bank of Ghana, the following are measures put in place to tackle 
recent depreciation of the Cedi. 
          The Bank identified some measures put in place over the years to address the 
exchange rate shocks: policy rate increases to tighten the money supply, selling 
additional forex, export repatriation-how to improve more currency into the banking 
system and ensuring that all exporters repatriate their funds into the banking system- 
educating financial product consumers to restore confidence in the economy, entering 
into a 3-year program with the International Monetary Fund that was expected to affect 
the Bank’s balance sheet by improving its reserves which would in turn be used to 
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support the balance of payments and the local currency, and collaborating with fiscal 
authorities to improve fiscal consolidation. 
4.2.4 Institutional challenge II: Ensuring sound monetary policy 
             The second objective of this research sought to identify particular challenges the 
Bank of Ghana faces in implementing sound and stable monetary policy. Thus, the 
following evidence supports this objective. 
1. The responses of the Bank largely indicate the failures and weaknesses of the 
Bank in discharging its duties. For example, one of the few research papers 
informing decisions of the Bank on the exchange rate pass-through in Ghana was 
last published in 2014, a year before the energy reform. Further to this, the 
research does not capture the substantial depreciations of the Cedi in 2014, since 
the research considered the years between 1994 and 2012. This creates a deep 
knowledge gap in implementing informed monetary policies. 
2. One of the weaknesses of the Bank’s research is that it does not consider the 
effect of the subsidy on petroleum products. Rising oil price is considered as one 
of the causes of inflation. But in Ghana, oil prices were hugely subsidised. Thus 
any study without that subsidy would produce results inconsistent with actual 
market realities.  
3. In a related development, the forex measures that were introduced in 2014 by the 
Bank to tackle the worsening rate of the Cedi, were largely restrictive, and it 
could only be effective for reducing economic activity, which was 
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counterproductive to inflation targeting. As such, it could be argued that the 
identified challenges are evidences of the failure of the Bank, the regulator.  
4. In addition, lending excessive amounts of money to the central government while 
raising monetary policy rate as was done simultaneously by the Bank, was a sign 
of institutional weakness. Raising the monetary rate is intended to reduce 
monetary supply so that inflation could be checked. And lending to the 
government does one thing: it increases the money supply, since the government 
would in turn spend. This is counterproductive to inflation targeting. 
5. Since the governor of Bank of Ghana is usually appointed by the President a 
year after general elections under the 4th Republic (1992) with the exception 
of Dr. G.K. Agama from 1988-1997, this confirms the theory that such appoints 
threaten the independence of the Bank. The effect of this phenomenon is that the 
governor is unable to ensure sound economic discipline, hence allowing fiscal 
indiscipline on the part of the Executive. This is a strong sign of institutional 
weakness. 
4.3 Tax components of petroleum products 
         The third research objective was to first determine the key factors accounting for 
the higher effect of tax components on petroleum products. Thus, this session provides 
evidence to support this objective. 
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          The new Energy Sector Levies Act 2015 (Act 899) discusses the taxes and levies 
charged on certain petroleum products. The results obtained show that LPG does not 
attract Road Fund and Energy Fund.  
The name and purpose of those taxes and levies are shown in Table 4.5 below. Together 
with the statutory margins and margins of the various players, the ex-pump price tends to 
rise with any change in any of the components. 
 
Table 4. 5 New taxes and levies on petroleum produces 
Source: NPA (2016) 
4.3.1 Institutional challenge III: The burden of taxation on petroleum products 
              The third research objective also sought to identify how the higher taxes affect 
consumers of petroleum products. The evidence below helps to achieve that objective. 
               Among the burdens of the petroleum tax has been the increases in taxes which 
prevents consumers from enjoying low ex-pump prices, thus increasing their expenditure 
P a g e 76       EXPLORING THE BENEFITS OF STRONG INSTITUTIONS TO 
GHANA 
 
        76 
 
on the same unit of petroleum products. This is an indication of institutional weakness on 
the part of the government acting through the Finance Ministry. This is because some of 
the taxes are as a result of financial misappropriations, which could be due to the lack of 
enforcement and application of legal framework by the responsible institutions. 
        The following illustrations indicate the effect of some of the new taxes on revenue 
and expenditure that are contained in new Energy Sector Levies Act 2015 (Act 899). 
Table 4. 6 Power generation and infrastructure support levy on petroleum products 
Source: ACEP (2016) 
       As seen from Table 4.5, ACEP analyzed the size of annual revenues to be generated 
from the levy based on product consumption (petrol, diesel, and LPG) using 2015 data. 
ACEP realized that the new levy could generate more than GHS 1 billion in a year, which 
is how much burden being placed on petroleum products consumers. This effectively 
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means that for the same unit to be consumed, consumers would have to pay over GHS1 
billion more in taxes in the coming years, ceterus paribus.  
        Similarly, with the introduction of the Price Stabilization and Recovery Levy, which 
is to provide a buffer for under-recoveries in petroleum sector, to stabilize petroleum 
prices and to subsidies pre-mix and residual fuel oil, ACEP observed that the levy could 
generate about GHS 400 million annually based on 2015 consumption levels of the same 
products: petrol, diesel, and LPG. Table 4.6 shows this analysis below. 
Table 4. 6: Price stabilization and Recovery levy 
Source: ACEP (2016) 
Table 4.6 indicates that to consume the same unit of petroleum products in 2016, for 
example, consumers would need to pay about GHS400 million more in additional taxes 
for the purpose of the new stabilization and recovery levy. 
More importantly, the tax structure reveals that consumers are double taxed, 
because of the introduction of the Special Petroleum Tax (SPT), as seen in Appendix 3. 
From Table 4.7 below, it can be observed that the effect of the 17.5% Special Petroleum 
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Tax, which is a tax on several other taxes, levies, and margins, would be about GHS675 
million in revenues that would be coughed up by consumers in just a year. 

















   674,960,266.7
9 
Table 4. 7 Size of double taxation on consumers 
Source: Africa Center for Energy Policy (2016) 
Table 4.7 above indicates an additional GHS 675 million taxes being imposed on 
consumers for the same unit of petroleum products to be consumed. This confirms the 
economic convention that due to the inelastic demand for petroleum products, 
governments are able to raise more revenue from petroleum products consumption. 
To understand the impact of the levies on petroleum product prices, a 
comprehensive analysis conducted by ACEP (2016) was used, as seen in Appendix 1. 
According to ACEP, since the Act 899 was passed and the various levies applied, there 
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have been different versions of the relative impact of the levies on the ex-pump prices of 
petroleum products. For example, the Minister of Finance told Parliament of Ghana that 
the effect of the levies would amount to a 5% increase in the price of petroleum, 2.9% in 
the price of diesel, and 1.74% in LPG price, as shown in Table 1.1.  
However, ACEP (2016) observed that the effects of the levies on ex-pump prices 
are much greater and punitive. ACEP (2016) estimated the levies had led to increase in 
the ex-pump price of petrol per liter by 33%, 40% on diesel per liter, and 22% on LPG 
per kilogram.  
Also, with the current levies, the tax component in proportion to the ex-pump 
prices of petrol and diesel are 41% and 42% respectively. This result is indicated in 
Appendix 1. The IMF shows that average tax share in ex-pump prices of petrol and diesel 
in developing countries ranges between 22% and 30%. This effectively means that the 
share of taxes in petroleum prices in Ghana is one of the highest in the developing world. 
           Furthermore, there are concerns of imposing extreme and additional burden on 
consumers due to the imposition of the BOST margin, since BOST is already renting out 
its facilities to BDCs and the BDCs pass this rental cost through their margins (ACEP, 
2016). ACEP (2016) has also revealed that TOR Debt Recovery Levy has been overpaid. 
              Even though the exploratory levy was abolished by Act 899, which seemed to 
relieve consumers, the new levies have significantly neutralized the effect of the 
abolished levies. Also, the introduction of Act 899 led to astronomical increases in old 
P a g e 80       EXPLORING THE BENEFITS OF STRONG INSTITUTIONS TO 
GHANA 
 
        80 
 
levies. For instance, the Road Fund has been increased by 433%. In addition to this, the 
cross subsidy levy has been repackaged into the Price Stabilization and Recovery Levy, 
and it is now limited to only pre-mix and residual fuel oil, according to ACEP. 
             According to ACEP (2016), consumers have overpaid the TOR debt. This is 
because at the time the levy was instituted, TOR debt stood at GHS450 million. By 2009, 
the total debt had grown to GHS900 million due to non-application of the revenues to 
service the debt as well as interest accumulation. In a press statement, ACEP (2016) 
stated that, “Our analysis shows that between 2009 and 2015, the total collection from the 
levy is in excess of GHS1.9 billion. This effectively amortizes the debt, assuming an 
interest rate of 10%.” Therefore, the continual repayment of TOR debt is a sign of 
institutional failure and weakness. For example, TOR Debt Recovery Fund Levy Act 
2003 (Act 642) states that, “The Minister shall within three months after the end of each 
financial year, submit a report on the Fund to Parliament.” There is evidence to the effect 
that the Finance Minister failed to comply with the legislative requirement, according to 
ACEP(2016). 
           Apart from paying higher electricity tariffs, consumers are also being mandated to 
pay debts accumulated from inefficiencies on the part Volta River Authority and 
Electricity Company of Ghana, through the introduction of the Power Generation and 
Infrastructure Support Levy. This is the climax of the power of the executive arm of 
government, reflecting how consumers are taxed to pay for inefficiencies and failures of 
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state institutions. More worrying is the fact that consumers and the general public do not 
know the exact amount of the debt they are paying for. 
4.4 Civil societies’ role under deregulation 
          Last but not, the fourth research objective was to investigate ways the various civil 
society organisations participate in making the deregulation exercise effective and 
sustainable. Below are some evidence supporting this objective. 
           The Responses analyzed suggest that the various civil society organisations are 
actively engaged in the downstream industry, primarily in the form of advocacy. 
Examples of these organisations are the Africa Centre for Energy Policy, Imani Ghana, 
the Institute of Economic Affairs, the African Centre for Economic Transformation, and 
many other partners. These organisations provide alternative policies, value for money 
analysis, and they advocate for transparency and accountability in revenue and 
expenditure management. According Imani Ghana, “The CSOs mainly will act as 
'watchdogs' to ensure all stakeholders play by the book.” 
4.4.1 Institutional challenge IV: Impediments to the CSOs 
        The following are considered as challenges facing the civil organisations, 
particularly with their participation in the petroleum downstream industry. This session 
answers the last part of the fourth objective. 
        First, primarily, the challenge has been the opacity of information as well as the 
technical nature of scant information that is made available. Thus, the final consumer is 
not empowered to demand appropriate prices from OMCs, for example (Imani Ghana, 
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2016), (ACEP, 2016), and (IEA, 2016). This phenomenon makes the work of these 
organisations hard, since they rely on information to make their publications. 
        Secondly, there is a high tendency to be named anti-government when some 
publications are more revealing. This atmosphere does not encourage private 
participation, and it has the potential to tarnish the image of such organisations, or 
persons within those organisations. 
                         Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations  
5.0 Conclusions 
         By observation, it can be said that it is too early to determine the impact of the 
deregulation exercise.  
Also, it is observed that the National Petroleum Authority still remains relevant, in terms 
of monitoring the performance of the downstream market. However, its responsibilities 
are extended to cover the activities of the Atuabo processing plant. The increasing 
number of BDCs, OMCs, LPGMCs, and other petroleum service providers (PSPs), calls 
for a well-resourced regulator. 
          It also revealed that the government still has the power to use certificate of 
emergence to influence market outcomes, especially during elections. 
        In addition, some small OMCs lack the capacity to determine their own prices, and 
this signals the strength of those players in a deregulated market. The effect is that, if 
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these small firms fail to improve operations, resulting in shut-downs, the market could 
favor the big four players, which could reduce competition. 
        Furthermore, the formation of associations of the various market players could 
threaten the success of the deregulation exercise. The researcher believes that such 
associations would be useful and relevant if the government still controlled the market. 
        The results revealed that the major threats to the deregulation exercise are the freight 
on board (FOB) charges- caused by the exchange rate movements-the taxes on the 
petroleum products, and the world oil price. Though taxes remain constant over long 
periods, world oil prices and FOB charges change oven. 
        Since the two main threats to the deregulation are as a result of foreign trade, 
resourcing Tema Oil Refinery and encouraging private sector participants in the refinery 
of petroleum products, could be a game changer, especially in terms of strengthening the 
Cedi, and reducing trade imbalances.  
       The civil society organizations play a significant role in promoting the interests of 
the general public. However, inadequate data availability and negative tagging threaten 
their work. 
5.1 Recommendations 
       Based on the above conclusions, the following recommendations are made.  
First, the National Petroleum Authority needs further strengthening. The NPA 
must invest in innovative ways in performing its duties: employ more advanced 
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technologies to monitor products characteristics, resource its human capital to provide 
more accurate information to the general public, for example, and increase its presence in 
the various districts through partnership with other institutions, CSOs, and other private 
players.  
Second, Parliament of Ghana may have to passage Legislative Instruments to 
make the arbitrary reversal of the deregulation exercise by the government more costly 
and punitive. This would sustain the deregulation in election years, and it would 
absolutely take governments out of the market. 
Third, Parliament may have to consider the passage of anti-trust laws to check 
cartelization and other market inefficiencies. This is because the NPA Act is insufficient 
to tackle the issues of collusion. This is especially necessary because the deregulation 
exercise is expected to attract huge investments in the future, which could lead big firms 
to consolidating. It could also check mergers and acquisitions. 
Fourth, since TOR has largely remained inefficient due to poor management, 
government could enter into private-public partnerships to make it operational and 
economically attractive. This could save Ghana some millions of Dollars that would 
otherwise be spent on imports. 
Fifth, another option to increase local refineries could be attracting private players 
to set up refineries. This could be done through tax breaks and friendly environments, in 
terms of infrastructure. 
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Sixth, Parliament may also have pass legislations to restrain excessive and 
incessant lending by the Bank of Ghana. The current legal framework has been largely 
supportive of lending, which has made monetary policy largely ineffective and 
unfriendly. 
Also, the passage of the Right to Information Bill and the Ghana Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative Bill would advance access to information. This would 
promote the work of civil societies that rely on such information for public education. 
Such Bills must be instructive to encourage its enforcements. 
Other recommendations are that other researchers should study the full effect of 
the exchange rate pass-through, especially when there is fuel reform. 
Also, a comparative analysis of the effect of an operation TOR on the Ghanaian 
economy, especially when there is deregulation, would be helpful. This could encourage 
government to invest in TOR. 
After some reasonable time, researchers must consider the effect of the 
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5.2 Appendixes 
APPENDIX 1: The targeting efficiency of social protection programs in Ghana 
(percentage of each program benefits that reach the poorest quintile) 
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Appendix 2: Ex-refinery price build up for BDCs and Refineries 
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Appendix 3: Ex-pump price build-up for OMCs & LPGMCs 
 
Source: NPA (2016) 
Appendix 4: Petroleum Products Consumption 
 
Source: NPA (2015) 
 
Petroleum Products ('000 tonnes)                 2008                2012             2015            2020
LPG                                                                              134.0             176.0            237.0            300
Kerosene and Jet Fuel                                         219.0             242.0            300.0            350.0
Diesel                                                                         1,128.0          1,470.0        1,800.0         2,100.0
Gasoline Premium                                                 711.0             825.0            970.0            1,200.0    
Gasoline Pre-mix                                                    70.0               75.0               80.0              85.0
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Appendix 5: Impact of Levies on Ex-pump Prices 
Price Build Up With Old Levies based on January 1, 2016 Prices 
 
Source: ACEP (2016) 
 
Source: ACEP (2016) 
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Source: ACEP (2016) 
Appendix 6: Sample research questions for the National Petroleum Authority 
                                                   Ashesi University College 
Exploring the potential benefits of strengthening institutions to the economy of 
Ghana: The case of the downstream full petroleum sector deregulation in Ghana.                   
Investigator: Shedrach Gyeni Akesse 
Contact: shedrach.akesse@ashesi.edu.gh 
Supervisor: Dr. Stephen Armah.  
Contact: searmah@ashesi.edu.gh 
Semester: Spring 
To the respondent:  
P a g e 91       EXPLORING THE BENEFITS OF STRONG INSTITUTIONS TO 
GHANA 
 
        91 
 
Please, participation in this research is voluntary, and you may withdraw your 
participation with no penalty. Also, information received is deemed public, unless stated 
otherwise. You may request for anonymity. 
Interview: Please, this interview, among other things, is to understand how the National 
Petroleum Authority is positioned to exercise its role in the deregulated petroleum sector. 
Structured Research Questions for the National Petroleum Authority (NPA) 
1.  The government has fully deregulated the downstream petroleum sector through 
the NPA. What are the implications of this deregulation exercise on  
a. the National Petroleum Authority itself 
b. the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) 
c. the Bulk Distribution Companies (BDCs) 
d. Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) 
e. Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation Company Limited (BOST) 
2. Prior to full deregulation, the NPA set prices of petroleum products. 
 a. What major factors were considered to set ex-pump prices? 
b. Which of the factors was the most significant? 
3. Full deregulation is likely to deliver gains if the market is efficient. According to 
the NPA, is the downstream industry perfectly competitive, oligopolistic, or it is an 
imperfect market? 
4.  A few large OMCs and BDCs have large market shares. This might affect the 
performance of the market. How is the consumer protected against 
a. low quality 
b. shortage 
c. externalities, like oil spills, explosions etc. 
d. and the profit making tendencies of the OMCs and BDCs? 
5.  In periods of soaring prices, especially during general elections, what strategies are 
put in place to protect the sustainability of the deregulation policy when 
a. the rise in prices is due to increasing world oil prices? 
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b. the rise is due to poor performance of the Cedis against the US Dollar? 
c. the rise is due to a rise in, or introduction of, taxes/levies by the Finance Ministry? 
6.  Assume a stable currency and an optimum taxation on petroleum products. How 
would an operational Tema Oil Refinery impact on 
a. petroleum pricing 
b. exchange rate of the Cedis 
c. domestic employment 
d. cost production for oil dependent firms 
e. contribution of the petroleum sector to Ghana’s GDP 
7. Certain portions of National Petroleum Act, 2005 Act 691, do not support the 
current full deregulation exercise.  
a. How does this impede the work of the NPA? 
b. What is the progress on the amendment of the legal framework backing the NPA? 
8.  Before the full deregulation exercise, what material challenges did the NPA face 
while exercising its role in the downstream market? 
9.  The full deregulation exercise was passed in June 2015. During certain periods of 
falling world oil prices, the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) and Bulk 
Distribution Companies (BDCs) did not reduce prices by the same measure. What 
factors explain this phenomenon? 
10. Following (Q5) above, a month after the deregulation policy in 2015, the Africa 
Center for Energy Policy, through a press conference, realized inconsistencies and 
abuse of consumers by the OMCs in terms of pricing. ACEP found that the 
reduction in fuel prices by the OMCs was not consistent with the world oil price 
reduction. In such and similar situations, what sanctions are applicable? 
11.  The downstream petroleum sector contributes about 10% to Ghana’s GDP (NPA, 
2015). Since the full deregulation exercise was passed, what are some of the leading 
challenges threatening the effectiveness and sustainability of the full deregulation 
exercise? 
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12. One of the key institutions in the sector is the NPA, the regulator of the industry. 
How is the NPA positioned to tackle the challenges known to the regulator? 
 
13. Essentially, the deregulation policy is to give power back to the market players. All 
other factors held constant, what are some of the material benefits of having a 
regulator in a deregulated industry? 
14. Key institutions identified in the downstream petroleum sector include the Finance 
Ministry, the National Petroleum Authority, the Ministry of Petroleum, and the 
Bank of Ghana. In what material ways do Ghanaians stand to benefit from the 
deregulation policy when 
a. the NPA is strengthened? 
b. then Finance Ministry taxes optimally? 
c. the Central achieves a stable exchange rate? 
Office of respondent…………………………………………………….. 
Signature……………………………………………………………………. 
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